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!lHE PIINING INDUSTRY IN THE CONTMT OF SOUTH 
AFRICA' S ECONOMIC DEFEXOPMENT, 1910-1940 
Duncan Innes 
This paper attempts to raise and come to terms with some of the more general 
issues concerning accumulation in the mining industry of South Africa. In order to 
situate the process of mining accumulation within its social context, the paper first 
deals with the relationship of mining capital to other fractions of the South African 
bourgeoisie, concentrating in particular on the question of industrial expansion 
during the twenties. An examination then takes place of the relationship between the 
different groups within the mining capitalist class in order to explain the shifts in 
dominance that occurred within that class, 
The Context of Mining Accumulation 
The task of defining the context in which mining capital is situated is 
extremely complex, since it involves not only an analysis of the development of South 
African capitalism in general but also its relationship with international capitalism, 
and not surprisingly there are a number of different views on the subject. The period 
to be considered in this paper is in particular open to a number of interpretations 
and I will have to begin by distinguishing rqy position from one which is currently 
held by certain academics and has been argued most forcefully by Dave Kaplan. (1) 
This view explicitly argues that mining capital is synonymous with 
imperialism and that mining capital during the twenties and thirties was opposed to 
the industrialization of South Africa. Implicit in this mgument, it would seem 
to me, is a theory of the nature of the development of capitalism in general, which 
wgues that imperialism aims at expanding capitalism in the centre by the under- 
development of the periphery. Since mining capital in South Africa is a branch of the 
imperialist network, it is assumed to have an interest in the underdevelopment of South 
Africa. (2) It is further argued that mining/imperialist capital was hegemonic in 
South Africa from 1870 until 1924. However, in 1924, according to this view, mining 
capital lost hepmony, as represented by the rise to power of the ~ationalist/lsbour 
Pact Government (representing llnationalv interests), which initiated a process of 
industrialization in South Africa that was not in the interests of mining capital. 
In fact, according to this argument, mining capital did all it could to stop this 
industrialization but without success (even during the period of fusion when its so- 
called political representatives, Smuts ' S party, shared power with the ~ationalists) , 
and it was only much later that they, together with other fractions of imperialist 
capital, came to see the benefits to be derived (i.e. the profits to be made) from 
industrialization and therefore begm to support it (and in so doing undemined the 
independence of the national bourgeoisie). (3) 
While I do agree with some aspects of this analysis, X think: i.t is 
necessary for ms Ln reject it in its present form, firstly because I am unhappy with 
some of the teminolo in which it is couched (and this is not just a semantic but 
a conceptual objectioz and, secondly, because I. think it has a number of serious 
weaknesses, both theoretical and. empirical. 
The first major theoretical objection that I have to this argument is the 
validity of the premises on which I think it is based - that is, the assumption that 
international capital expands through the underdevelopment of the periphery. (4) 
International capital does not necessarily undermine or destroy the industrial 
potential of the periphery, it rather attempts to ensure that development in the 
periphery occurs in a way which is conducive to the expansion of international 
capital - i.e. it distorts economic development in the periphery rather than under- 
developing the periphery. This distinction on a theoretical level is crucial because 
it means that while at some periods it may be necessary for international capital in 
its own interests to destroy various developing industries in the periphery, at other 
times, theoretically at least, it may be in its interests to encourage the rise of 
peripheral industries. 
My second objection relates to the wa~r in which the centre - the developed 
capitalist world - is conceived. Although verbal homage is paid to the class natme 
of the centre, none the less it is in effect conceived as a homogeneous entity, which 
has only one interest. (5) The fact that the centre is composed of different classes 
and fractions of classes which have different interests which can at times be 
contradictory is excluded from the analysis. Lnstead, "international capitalv is 
always presented as a single force which is always in opposition to "national capital" 
interests. The-question needs to be asked whether there are not some classes or 
fractions of the ruling class in the centre which may at certain times have broadly 
similar interests to those of fractions of "national" capital in the periphery. 
Having outlined two of my major objections to Kaplanfs thesis, let me now 
briefly outline my own position. Ny starting point is that the expansion of 
international capitalism involves not the necessary underdevelopment of the peripheral 
economy, but rather its distorted development. That is, in order for capitalism to 
expand on a world scale, it is inevitable that some industrial development will occur 
in the periphery as well as in the centre. The forces that will militate against 
industrial development in the periphery will be, in particular, those manufacturing 
classes situated in the centre whose growth depends on supplying the markets of the 
periphery with certain goods. (6) However, there are those classes in the centre which 
may develop a definite interest in some form of industrial development in the periphery. 
For example, investors in foreign mining concern have an iaterest in securing cheap 
and steady supplies of inputs for their mining operations. To the extent that these 
needs can be met by imports from the centre there is no conflict of interest between 
this class of investolsand the class of industrialists which supplies their needs. 
But, as soon as the centre is unable to meet their needs - as soon as the price of 
inputs escalates through monopoly pricing (e.g. the dynamite monopoly), rising wage 
costs, etc., in the centre, or as soon as deliveries are disrupted as a result of 
international disturbances (depressions, wars, etc.) - then the class of investors 
develops an interest in establishing industries and infrastructure in the periphery 
which will enable their needs for cheap and reliable inputs to be met by local 
production. And to the extent that the development of these industries requires 
protection from the states in the periphery, this class will support those measures. 
It is my contention that precisely these conditions existed in South Africa 
between 1914 and 1924,and that therefore at least a powerful section of international 
mining capital favoured and encouraged the expansion of industries in the country prior 
to tine advent of the Pact Government. Therefore, while industrial development in 
South Africa can be seen as being in the interests of agricultural and manufacturing 
capital (as Kaplan argues), we must also look at industrialization from the point of 
view of mining capital to see how it could benefit thereby as well (a point which 
Kaplan isores). If it can be established that mining capital did have an interest 
in industrialization, then Kaplanls whole argument concerning mining capital" loss 
of he~mony over the State is, it seems to me, brought into question. Because, if 
industrialization is conceived of as being in the interests of mining capital as well, 
then the advent of the Pact Government must be seen not as a response to a hdamental 
shift in class power with a consequent loss of mining capital's hegemony over the 
State (as Kaplan argues), but rather as a response to changas in the"politica1 scene", 
which do not have a n ~ r  effect on hegemony at all. (7) Explanations for the fall of the 
&uts Government can then be sought, inter alia, in its popular rejection following 
its brutal suppression of the 1922 mine-workers strike. Furthermore, viewing the 
political change of Government in this light makes the explanation for the establishment 
of the Coalition Government in 1932 a far simpler affair in that it can be interpreted 
as necessary that mining capital, which is still hegemonic, should have direct 
representation in the Government as well as the other major capitalist classes, in whose 
joint interests industrialization is being carried out. Kaplan, by arguing that mining 
capital lost hegemony in 1924, has, in my opinion, peat difficulty in explaining why 
it was that Sknuts% Party, according to him the only representative of mining capital 
and therefore bitterly opposed to industrialization, should participate as filly as it 
did in stimulating the process of industrialization after 1933. Part of the problem 
of Kaplants analysis would seem to lie in his reliance on the explanatory force of the 
concept of hegemony which he does not actually define, and at times he seems to me to 
come dangerously close to be swing that the change in Government in 1924 is proof that 
heemony had passed from class to another (a), whereas at other times he points out 
clearly that hegemony is a concept which embraces a much wider sphere than that of 
party political activity, and that therefore changes in Government do not necessarily 
say anything about changes in hegemony. (9) 
It is not possible to deal more fully with the problems of Kaplmls analysis 
here since there is a restriction on space. Nor can I do more than sketch out m;y own 
position and add a few important empirical statements to support the major plank in my 
argument, which is that South African mining capital in general was not necessarily 
opposed to industrial development and, indeed, that it found its direct political 
representatives, Smutsls Party, wanting in some spheres of promoting and protecting 
local indus tries. 
331 1910/1911 the gross output of secondary industry in South Africa was a 
little over £22m and its net product was 6.8% of the total national income of the 
Union, (10) Small though this output was, the influence of imperialist mining capital 
in the total was not inconsiderable, with groups like De Beers Consolidated manufacturing 
explosives, Central Mining providing a considerable portion of the country's electricity 
via the Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company (founded in 1906), and Lewis and 
Yaks manufacturing a wide range of commodities. W e n  at this stage some protection 
for local industries, through import duties and preferential rail rates, existed, and 
these were extended by the Government after the Cullinan Commission on Trade and 
Industries (1910-11) recommended that adequate protection be given to agriculture and 
industrial undertakings. (11) But it was the Great War which provided the major 
stimulus to secondary industry in South Africa, for, with shipping space reduced to a 
minimum and prices soaring, South African industry was able to expand to a considerable 
extent. Industrial production rose from £221~ in.1910-11 to B40m in 1915-16, £49~1 in 
1916-17, k60m in 1917-18 (12), by which time it accounted for 9.6% of the Unionts 
National Income (compared with 21.6% for farming and 20.3% for mining). 
Fwcthermore, the stimulus given to secondary industry by the war did not stop 
in 1918. By l920/2l, industrial production had risen to 898m (12.3% of the national 
income - fanning 18.2°/0 and mining 15.774, and it is estimated that the volume of output 
increased by approximately 43% between 1916/17 and 1920/2l. (13) Between l9lO and 1921 
employnent in secondary industry rose from 55,000 to 180,000 and salaries and wages 
from £5m to £22m. The period also saw the establishment on a significant scale of new 
industries - in particular,steel, engineering and breweries - controlled by mining 
capital. In 1918 the Directors of Consolidated Gold Fields reported that "industrial 
development [in South Africa] h a  been so stimulated by war conditions that South 
Africa's annual value of manufactures is now ... above the value of the Transvaal gold 
output - a remarkable advance. Ekpansion in local industries continues apace, 
especially seeing that competition from other parts of the world is eliminated owing 
to war conditionst1. (14) By 1919 the Directors had noted that as a result of war 
conditions interrupting the supplies and. raising the prices of imported mining materials 
57.5% of the total spent by the Group on mining materials during the year was spent on 
locally manufactured goods. Fuxthermore, the directors were aaaamavlt that "industrial 
conditions in Englasltd md America do not tend to give encouragement for any hope of a 
marked reduction in the manufactured cost of imported articles for some timef1, and 
they concluded that "we should turn to a policy of fostering and encouragement of 
local manufactures (dependent as little as possible upon the importation of raw 
materials) with a view both to lessening our dependence on overseas industrial 
conditions and to being able, by creating internal and industrial competition, to take 
full advantage of cheaper local manufacturing costsn. (15) By the following. year 
Goldfields had acquired, inter alia, an engineering works, a building works, a 
furniture company, a trading company, and a brick and tile company. (16) Nor were 
Goldfields alone among the imperial concerns in their diversification into industry 
at this time. 13y 1920 the African and Ew?opean Investment Compaqy, in addition to 
its large f d n g  interests (1.5m English acres), had bought substantial shareholdings 
in South Afriom Breweries and the Union Steel Corporation of South Africa. (17) In 
1917 De Beers took a 50$ interest in the South African Marine, Fire and. General 
Snsmance C o m p w  'B), and in 1919 "the Company decided to embark upon a policy of 
industrial. expansion of their (explosives) factory at Somerset West . . . [In add~tion] 
It has been decided to erect a fertiliser factory which will be capable of producing 
large quantities of various classes of fertilisers, and which it is hoped will place 
these essential commodities at reasonable prices within the reach of all 
agriculturalists in the Union at an early date". (19) There are numsrous other 
examples of mining capital' S expansion into non-mining areas at this time, e.g. 
Central MinFngfs new interests in pipe works, brick md tile works, cement works, 
etc. (20) 
These interests, however, did not expand as rapidly as mining capital had 
hoped and the cause of the problem was not difficult to discern, for by the early120s 
industrial expansion in m o p e  was underway again. Mining capital was neither slow 
to understand the nature of the problem nor reticent in beginning immediate agitation 
to rectify the position. The Chairman of De Beers said to his shareholders: 'You 
will be somy to learn that the manufacture of fertilisers has been most 
disappointing .., We look to the Government to protect us against dumping from outside 
countries ... Well, superphosphates from overseas have been sold in South Africa at 
lower prices than ever before; the Government waa approached and ... a duaping duty 
of 5/- per ton was imposed; but this is wholly inadequate . . ." (21) The Chairmm of 
Consolidated Goldfields blamed the setback in his company8s industrial ventures on the 
fact that "competition from overseas has been severe and is likely to become 
increasingly keen in future. The Government of the Union", he continued, $'has been 
urged to bring in a large measure of protection for the benefit of local industries, 
but, althow it has done something to assist certain manufactures, it has stopped 
short of the general demds. (22) There are a number of other similas: statements 
in the reports of this period, probably the most eloquent coming from the Chairman of 
the Central Mining and Investment Company in 1923, following his consulting engineer's 
comment that "were it not for the continuance of dumping by foreign nanufacturezs the 
Company's businesses would show considerable expansion, especially in the coastal 
areas . . . Suitable representations have been made to the Union Government". (23) 
It would, however, be wrong to infer from the above om..ticisms that the 
Union Government had done nothing to promote industrialization In the countqr. The 
increased protection provided by the Government enabled the emerging industries at 
least to maintain themselves dming the onslaugSlt from European industries, asLd the 
Report of the Secretary of the Department of Mines and Industries in 1919 shows that 
the Government was keen to promote the expansion of certain inaustries in the country, 
especially steel, coal by-products, maize by-products, woollen manufactures, ship- 
building and repairing. Furthemore, it was of course the Smuts Government which 
passed the Electricity Act in 1922, which established the Electricity Supply Cormnission 
(ESCOM), whose explicit aim was ultimately to expropriate the Victoria Falls and 
Transvaal Power Company, controlled by mining capital, and. to centralize the whole 
electricity network in the country. (24) But, despite evidence to show that the Smuts 
Government did make some moves to protect and encourage the emerging industrial sector, 
these efforts were clearly insufficient to meet the needs of the emerging class of 
businessmen. However, as the above statements indicate, these efforts were also 
inadeqvate for those elements of mining capital who by this time were involved in 
industry,and those elements included the three most powerful mining pups: De Beers, 
Consolidated Goldfielh, and Central Mining. Thus it would not seem unreasonable to 
say that to the extent that the Pact Government moved to protect and encourage 
industrial eqaylmbon in South Africa, it was doing precisely what these powerw 
mining capitalists were agitating for. (1t is not surprising that one of the first 
Acts passed by the new Government - to provide bounties on the local production of 
iron and steel - was welcomed by African and Ehropean as a major stimulus to provide 
"a p a t  iron and steel industry" in the count and resulted in the Union Steel 
Corporation embaking on significant expansion7 (25) 
It would therefore seem true to s w  that by 1924 all of the major capitalist 
classes In South Africa favoured some form of industrialization and that where there 
were differences between these classes these were over what form the industrial 
development should take and over the rate at which it should proceed. Here, clearly, 
mining capital hoped for a slower and more subdued advance than the other two major 
capitalist classes and, their direct political representatives advocated. But this 
struggle revolves, essentially, asound the degree of industrialization in the country - 
it does not involve a qualitative change. (And the relatively slow rate of 
industrialization in South Africa prior to the outbreak of World War I1 would tend to 
suggest that mining capital's influence over the countryls economic development was not 
as weak as Kaplan would have us believe.) Thus it would seem to me that to put forward 
the argument that the Pact Govement carried out a policy of industrial development 
as proof that mining capital had lost hegemony is incorrect in that it ignores the fact 
of mining capital's interest and involvement in industrial exparxion. (26) 
The question of the degree to which the different capi'talist classes favoured 
industrial development is important because it relates to the problem of uinternationalfl 
versus "national" interests. As we have seen, following 1914, mining capital began to 
develop an interest in indwtrial development in South Africa to the extent that it 
served to build up a base and infrastructure which could supply them with cheap and 
reliable inputs to the mines. In this regard, then, the interests of this class moved 
closer to the interests of the local manufacturing and agricultural bourgeoisie who 
l favoured industrial development. But clearly the interests of this locally based 
bourgeoisie are more closely bound up with industrial development than are those of the ~ 
mining capitalists, because without such development these local classes can never l 
expand their base. It is precisely for this reason that the local capitalist classes 
adopted a, more aggressive approach to this question than did the mining capitalists. 
Furthemore, mining capital, which h o w  that it must provide much of the capital to 
finance this expansion, which in turn means cutting back on its other foreign 
operatiom and dealing with irate shareholders in the centre, will adopt a more 
cautious approach to the matter. Ultimately, of course, for most mining capitalists 
South Africa was only one area of their interests, albeit by far the most important 
single area. But the principle remains that, whereas mining capital's concern la~r in 
promoting their operations on a world-wide basis (and therefore in channelling surplus 
value back to London for investment in other parts of the world) (27), for the local 
capitalist classes their concern was to reinvest their surplus value locally to broaden l 
their base. 
Having said that, it now seems to me to be imporetant that we examine the 
mining capitalist class itself in order to see whether, at this time, they were all as 
ninternationally-orientedll as is often suggested. If we can establish that some 
fractions of the mining class had a greater interest in the development of the local 
econorqy than others, we shall have established an important structural difference 
Fractions of the mining class which could become the basis of a subsequent analysis to 
explain the changes that occurred in the power relationships between the various 
fractiom of the class over the next two decades. 
I1 Changing Relations within the Mining Industry 
By the time of Union the South African $-old mining industry, concentrated on 
the Witwatersrand, was dominated by a small number of powerful groups, the most 
important of which were the Central MinirpRand Mines Group, and, to a lesser extent, 
the Consolidated Goldfields Group. It was asound this time, however, that an important 
shift b e p  to occur in the centre of gold m activity. The mines of the central 
Rand, many of which had been in operation since the early 1890~1, were by now low-grade 
producers and profitability on these mines was falling. Ey July 1914, 13 Witwatersrand 
companies were making a working profit of 5/- or less per ton, while by 1918 the number 
of companies in this category had risen to 31 - which was 3/5 of the total number of 
producing mines. (28) This serious decline in the profitability of the central Rmd 
mines (the vast majority of which were owned by the major groups) was, however, offset 
by the increasing production of mines on the Far &st Rand. Between l914 and 1918 the 
number of opexating mines on +he Far East Rand rose from 9 to 11, while their goss 
profits rose from 22/11 per ton to 16/3 per ton. Over this same period the gmss 
profit8 of the central Rand. mines fell from 8/5 per ton to 3/9 per ton, and the nmber 
of operating mines fell from 45 to 38. This increasing difference in the profitability 
of mines on the two fields (from 4/7 in 1914 to 12/6 per ton in 1918) was achieved 
through s rising sevenue per ton and a lower increase of working costs per ton of Far 
East Rand mines compares with tho~e on the central Rand. (29) These changes, of 1 
course, b d  fa--reaching consequenoas on the fortunes of the companies which controlled 
the mines in the two areas. In 1914 the Far East Rand mines distributed less than 2@/o 
of the total dividends for the mining industry as a whole. In 1919, with their 
production a mere 2% of the total Transvaal tonnage, they none the less accounted for 
a massive 7% of the total distributed dividends. (30) l 
l 
Most of the mines on the Faz East Rand were, by lgI.7, controlled by two 
comp&mies, the Consolidated Mines Selection Company and the Rand Selection Corporation. 
Consolidated Mines Selection had held mineral ri&ts on the Far East R d  since the 
previous century. In 1905 this company was taken over by Dukelsbuhler and Co., a 
diamond trading concern controlled by %he Oppenheimer family. By 1916 Consolidated 
U e s  Selection had gained control of the Rand Selection Corporation, which was then 
known as the Transvaal Coal Trust and which held substantial mineral ri&ts in the 
area. Thus the Fas East Rand was in fact dominated by one Group - the Consolidated 
Mines-Rmd Selection Group. In 1917, in order to expand its operations in the area, 
the Group established the Anglo American Corpora%ion, under the Chairmanship of Ernest 
Oppenheimer . 
There was one important difference between the group which controlled the Fax 
East Rand and the other major gold mining groups. These latter were typical 
imperialist concerns in that their main interest in South Africa was to develop the 
goldfields and channel the surplus value gained therefrom back to London, where it was 
used to finance expansion on an PnCernational scale. In other words, South Africa was 
a l w ~ s  conceived of by these $roups as being only one part of their world-wide 
operations. Certainly it was an important -a, but it was by no means the only one. 
In 1920 less than 4007 of the Central MinirqpRand Mines Group interests were in 
Southern Africa, the rest being spread throueplout the world: in Nigeria, the Sudan, 
Trinidad, Britain itself, India, Bwm and the USA, to mention a few, (31) Also, 
almost half of the 40 principal investments of Gold Fields were outside southern 
Africa, and South African interests accounted for less than 509d of the total.  old 
Fieldfl had a large expansion progranme in the USA.) (32) This spread of interests 
contrasts markedly with the position of the Consolidated Mines Selection Group. In 
1917 over 86% of the Company's interests were in South Africa, the remainder beiw 
mainly in the US and Europe. (33) In 1919 over 88% of the company18 interests were in 
South Africa. (34) By 1922 the Group felt that it was so heavily involved in South 
Africa that its head office should be transferred to Johannesburg, and, furthermore, 
that the head office should come under the management of the Anglo American Corporation 
of South Africa, which would "take over all the Comparqyls South African assets". (35) 
In other words, Ang3.0 American was to become the centre of the Groupts operations 
(control over the Rand Selection Corporation had already passed to Anglo American in 
1919). Consolidated Mines Selection remained a London-based company whose source of 
wealth was confined to dividends received from its holding8 in Anglo American (most 
of which were redistributed to its own shareholders) and small profits made from stock 
exchange speculation, until the 19608, when it was revitalized by Anglo American as 
part of the new Charter Consolidated. The -10 American Corporation itself had no 
interests outside of southern Africa. 
This difference in the size of the hglo Groupfs International holdings, 
compared with those of the o a r  major groups, is crucial in any explanation of the 
uubsequent developments within the mining industry, for -10 American, with a highly 
profitable base on the Fa~c %BC Rand and oriented towards local as opposed to - "  . 
international operations, was well placed to become a powerful force in the mining 
industry. The question, however, arises of why it was that the -10 Group chose to 
expand its interests in southern Africa and why it did not, instead, follow the path 
of other imperialist concern and develop an international orientation. First of all, 
as we have seen, the proportion of its interests outside of southern Africa was small 
and therefore its facilities for expaneion outside of the area were limited. Secondly, 
the increased profitability of the Group (arising out of its Far East Rand interests) 
which made expansion possible occmed at a time when opportunities for new investment 
in many parts of the world were hanrpered by both the Great War and the depression which 
followed it from 1920 to 1922. Finally, and this ia by far the most important reason, 
opportunities for the type of investment which suited the character of the compaay 
suddenly presented themselves to the Group in southern Africa in 1918. The end of the 
War saw the large German diamond interests in South-West Africa put up for sale to 
British companies. The -10 American Group, via the Dunkelsbuhler connection, had 
long been involved in diamonds, and it was thus logical for this Group, with strong 
links with the diamond industry and funds available for expansion, to buy up most of 
the German fields, which it in fact did in 1920. Thus by 1921 the Groupfs future 
expansion was clearly dependent on its southern African interests, for not only was 
its major vehicle for expansion, the Anglo American Corporation, in control of most of 
the operating mines on the Far East Rand and of the large diamond fields in South-West 
Africa, but, furthermore, it was at this time forging important links with the emerging 
copper industry of Northern Rhodesia. The extent of the Group's interests in southern 
Africa and the development work still to be undertaken to bring these investments to 
mlurity - by 1925 two of Angle's Far East Rand mines had not yet reached the production 
stage, construction on its South-West African diamond mines was still underway, and the 
Rhodesian copper industry was in Its infancy - meant that the Group as a whole, and the 
-10 American Corporation in p&icular, had a commi-lment to southern Africa which far 
exceeded that of any other Group (this commitment is symbolized in the Group's decision 
to transfer its head office to South Africa in 1922). The result was that Anglo American 
was to develop a far more aggressive policy of local reinvestment than the other Groups 
and it was this policy which, combined with the fact that her access to the most 
profitable mineral resources in the area gave her the means to carxy it out, was 
ultimately to lead her to domination of the mining industry in South Africa. (36) 
1 shall do no more here than sketch out, very briefly, the path which this 
struggle within the mining industry took. (37) As a Group with large diamond interests 
and an aggressive local reinvestment policy, the Anglo American Group differed from its 
major competitors. This meant that, in order to capture potential mineral prospects for 
itself, Anglo American had not only to spend more time and money than most in seeking 
out new interests but they had also to keep themselves sufficiently liquid to buy up 
prospects as soon as they presented themselves. Sir Ernest Oppenheimer told his 
shareholders in 1924: "As you know, we have confined our activities to Southern Africa, 
and. l[ believe as much as ever in the future possibilities of this sub-continent and the 
great developmente we am likely to see in the near future ... It will be seen that the 
Corporation is in a very strong cash position and able to undertake any new and 
attractive business that ma;y come along.w (38) 
Their first major area of expansion occurred in the diamond industry, where 
a fierce struggle waged over a number of years as Anglo h 5 i o a i i  i%na&t, first, to oust 
De Beers from its dominant position in the industry (by buying up all available diamond 
fields outside the control of De Beers) and then to capture De Beers itself. This was 
eventually achieved in 1929. With its control of the diamond industsy secured, Anglo 
American was in a unique position vis-&via other m i n i n g  houses to have an alternative 
support during the times when the gold industry was in difficulty. Furthermore, by 
1930 An&lo American had secured, via the Rhodesian Anglo American Corporation, control 
over 560) of the huge Rhodesian copperfields, thus continuing to widen its base. The 
end of the depression saw the price of diamonds soar to new heights ( ~ e  Beers made 
E40m from the sale of stocks of diamonds accumulated between 1929 and 1934 alone), the 
copper price jumped, and, after South Africa left the gold standard, the price of gold 
also rose. The mining houses began to release capital for gold mining expansion and 
the Anglo American Group, utilizing profits from its gold and diamond interests, was in 
the forefront of the rush. By the mid-thirties Anglo American, together with new 
Consolidated Gold Fields, had opened up a new gold field - the Far West Rand and 
Klerksdop areas. By the end of World War I1 Anglo American had secured for itself 
the prime pick- on the fabulous Orange Free State goldfield (Anglo American 
controlled over half of the mines in the Free State, including six of the seven most 
successful mines). By the time the Free State mines were coming into production Anglo 
American~s dominant position in the industry was beyond doubt, stnd over the next few 
yeam An(T1.0 moved to secure this dominance. By 1960 Anglo American had acquired over 
50) of the sha,res in both the Central finingykand Mines Group and the JCI Group, and 
had thereby enmeshed both of these in its own Group network. It had, furthernore, 
acquired significant shareholdings in all the other Groups (over 400h in General Mining 
and around 107 in the three remaining soups). 
The story of Anglo American does not, of course, stop there, but an important 
chapter in its history does close at this point. That is, Anglo American mqy be seen 
as a m i n i n g  group oriented towards e ansion in southern Africa (with the exception of 
some diamond interests fltrter afiel? only until 1960. From then on, however, Anglo 
American evolved a new dimension to tis activities - an international dimension which 
was to convey it to almost all parts of the globe. 
In this paper I have attempted to raise some problems concerning the way in 
which it seems to me much of the literature on South Africa conceptualizes the role of I 
imperialist capital in South Africa, the relationship between various classes that 
developed as a result of knperial involvement in the axea, and the way in which mining 
capital itself is conceived. 
l 
I would argue t2at some of the misconceptions, as I see them, in our 
treatment of the issues referred to here arise out of an inadequate conceptualization 
of the w a ~  in which international capitalism operates on a world scale. While it 
remains true that international capital expands on a world basis through the 
extraction of surplus value from one area and its re-employment in new ventures, it is 
necessary to stress that it in no way contradicts the exploitative nature of 
imperialism for such re-investment to occur within the same social fomtion as the 
original extraction took place. If we accept this premise, then clearly,should 
conditions arise which encourage international capitalists to involve themselves 
heavily in one particular area, this can occur in a number of forms. Two possibilities 
are that it can either occur through their involvement in expanding the indwtxial base 
of the area in their own interests or it can occur through their total commitment to 
that area in terms of the reinvestment of their profits. In the first case, 
international involvement maJr still be seen as simply to secure for foreign investors 
the greatest amount of surplus value which, following repatriation to the centre, they I 
seek to relocate elsewhere (although even here new possibilities for alliances with 
local classes and greater involvement in the development of the area arise). In the 
second case, however, the commitment of this fraction to one particular region as the 
sole area of their operations means that that fraction must be viewed in a fundmentally 
different light. It, of course, still remains a fraction of international capital in 
that a large proportion of its shareholders (the majority) axe situated in the centre 
and it remains dependent on the financial markets of the centre to raise m c h  of its 
capital. But, given that it, unlike the other international concerns, stands or falls 
solely on the performance of its local ventures, it acquires an interest in the local I 
social fonaation which is much closer to the interests of the locally based capitalist 
classes. This means that standard interpretations of mining capital as "foreignff or 
"metropolitanf1 capital, which ignore these dimensions of the problem, are inadequate 
to explain both the structural divisions within the mining industry and the implications 
of thin for mining capitalta relationship to the development of the South African social 
f omatf on. 
It is contention that the -10 American Group, as a fraction of 
international capital with a strong local commitment, had a far greater interest than 
any other fraction of mining capital in the expanded reproduction of the South African 
social foxmation, and that it is this which explains both its heavy economic a;nd 
political involvement in the area as well as the relative ease and e-rness with which 
it has sought to fom- economic and political alliances with other local classes. Its 
international links notwithstanding, Anglo American should thus be seen as being, in 
a profound sense, a nrepresentativefl of South African capitalist interests - a G m u p  
whose interest in the expanded reproduction of the South African econoqy, as the basis 
of its own activity, gives it a particular South African character that other 
international concerns operating in the country do not possess. Its future is 
interwoven with the destiny of the country. Its interests, and the struggle to 
preserve and promote these, axe inextricably bound up with the interests of the other 
capitalist classes in South Africa. Unlike them, thou&, it is also historically 
linked directly to the centre of international capitalism and thus provides a bridge 
between the centre and. the periphery, a bridge which daily gmws stronger as South 
Africals incorporation into the world capitalist system at the level of a rising 
industrial power increases. 
Notes 
- 
(1) The most articulate form of this argument is to be found in D. Kaplan, llCapitalist 
Development in South Africa: Class Conflict and the Statef1, University of Sussex, 
IDS Discmsion Paper, 1974. Though the thesis contained in Kaplanls paper is also 
adhered to and advocated by a number of other writers, I will be confining my 
remarks to the treatment given to the subject by Kaplan. 
(2) By underdevelopment it is meant that imperialism and mining capital have an 
interest in undermining and. even destroying the industrial potential of the 
periphery, or at any rate to have no interest in developing the industrial 
potential of the periphery (which amounts to the same thing in the end). 
(3 )  See the following quotes from Kaplan, op. cit. (pp. 23 anti 24): "At a later date, 
the primary division in capital, i.e. that between I foreign' and 'indigenous1 
capital, is increasingly rendered less meaningful ... The State again plays an 
essential part in this process that renders this possible t h r o w  facilitating, 
and at times enforcing, the tinterpenetration' of capitals ... The process of 
capital interpenetration ... is a key manifestation of the South African 
bourgeoisie into the international system and as such undermines their existence 
as a differentiated fraction with distinct economic interests apart from those of 
international capital. " (Kaplant S emphasis) 
(4) See, for example, Kaplant S references to Bettelheim on p. 6, and, further, the 
following quote (from p. 7), which makes clear his view of mining capital's lack 
of interest in promoting industrial development: "At the level of the capitalist 
mode, the metropolitan bourgeoisie needed to exercise hegemony to ensure that 
surpluses earned would be "patriatedl , and/or retained by the mining companies 
to finance t h e i r 9  fkcther development. On the other hand, the two elements of 
the indigenous bourgeoisie - the capitalist agrarian class and the embryonic urban 
bourgeoisie - were desirous of channelling such surplus into their own activities 
and/or into internal infrastructural developments which would aid their own 
operations. (!&plan' S emphasis) 
(5) See KapLanl S continuous references to the "metropolitan bourgeoisief1 without ever 
specifying whether he is referring thereby to a fraction of the ruling class in 
the centre (and, if so, which fraction) or to the ruling class as a whole (and, 
if so, of which fractions it is composed). 
(6) Even here, however, there is a contradiction since industrialization of the 
periphery will increase the areals buying power and is therefore also in the 
interests of the manufacturing class in the centre. Par% of the l'solutionft o 
this contradiction lies in selective - i.e. distorted - industrial development 
in the periphery. Furthermore, expansion of industries in the periphery will of 
course be in the interests of that fraction of the mufacturing class in the 
aentre which produces capital goods. 
See D. Kaplan, "An Analysis of the South African State in the IFusion! Period, 
1932-39", University of London, ICS Paper, 1976, in which, basing himself on 
Poulantzas, he brings out the distinction between the flpolitical scene", in 
which party political changes occur but hegemony is not affected, and '!the 
sphere of political practicesu, a wider concept of which the party political is 
only one aspect and which is the sphere in which hegemony is determined (p. 4). 
See, for example, p. 17 of his 1974 paper, in which he stated that: 'The fruits 
of the [~ationalist-~abour] alliance were evident in the Pact Government of 
1924 - a crucial watershed in S. African history. Prior to this date, hegemony 
l w  with %he @metmpolitan~ bourgeoisie, and even after this date the 
lmetropolitanl bourgeoisie remained a potent force, thou@ not the dominant one, 
in the South African political arena." See also his statement on p. 16 in 
which he argues that the Nationalist Labour "alliance ... would effectively end 
the hegemony of the Imetropolitan bourgeoisie' at the level of the capitalist 
mode. State power could now pass under the hegemony of an ascendant 
bourgeoisie ..Ir A further example is to be found on p. 19. 
It would seem to me that ultimately my disagreements with Kaplan will centre on 
his use of the tern "hegemonyn and the precise meaning he attaches to it. It 
is repettable that neither in his l974 nor in his 1976 paper does he offer a 
clear definition of the term. The concept is obviously intended to refer to a 
substantial shift in class power, but the problem is to define precisely what 
the indices are to be by which that "shiftf1 is to be measured. Without such 
precision the concept seems to be so broad as to be capable of being used in a 
number of different ways m d  as such is not helpful to scientific research. 
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There are a number of other areas in which, according to Kaplan, the Pact 
Government attacked the mining industry, and these he presents as further 
evidence to support his case that mining capital had lost hegemony. The most 
important arguments advanced in this regard are that the Pact Government 
increased white mine workers' wages and that it significantly increased m i n i n g  
taxation. There is no space to deal with these arguments in detail here, but 
two points can be made. The first is that, althow white mineworkerst wages 
did rise under the Pact Government, at no stage did they ever reach the level 
they had achieved prior to the 1922 strike. Furthermore, over this period 
si&ficant hpmvements occurred in the level of productivity on the mines 
(as a result of important Lechnological advances such as the large-scale use 
of the revolutionary jack hammer drills). Secondly, the first really 
significant increase in mining taxation only occurred in 1934 - i.e. long after 
the period of the Pact Government had ceased. This tax increase (resulting in 
a jump in State revenue from mining from E4.3 in 1933 to 814.5m in 1934) was 
imposed by the Smuts-Hertzog coalition Government and was in response to the 
sudden rise in gold mining profits which accompanied the abandonment of the 
gold stand&. Despite the new tax - and surely this is the crucial index - 
gold mining profits after taxation show a considerable increase after 1933. 
Finally, of course, public statements of leaders of the mining industry 
expressing fears that industrialization would ruin the industry (which it did 
not do) are often used as evidence that mining capital as a whole rejected 
industrializationper Be. I have already made the point that mining capital 
was involved in a struggle over the form that industrialization should -take, 
and I would suggest that most of these statements should be mad in this light. 
EZlsthemore, it is worth mentioning that mining leaders have since the inception 
of the industry made public announcements about the forthcoming demise of the 
industry, and their attacks on the Pact Govczment a m  not quilitatively 
dlfferenf Prom their attacks on the previous Ehuts Government, which they claimed, 
inter alia, acted too often in the interests of white mineworkers, did nothing 
to help them secure an adequate supply of black labour, and taxed them to death. 
(see Mining Compstny Reports, 1917-1924. ) 
This argument should not be seen to be contradictory to my earlier remarks 
concerning mining capital18 support for industrial development, for it is 
precisely through such development, which would cheapen their inputs, that 
mining capital would ulthately achieve its purpose of increasing the share of 
surplus value which it could repatriate. 
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This structural difference between Anglo American a3ld the other groups, so l 
cruoial to an understanding of the reasons for Anglo American's domination of 
the industry, is not mentioned in any of the available literature on the subject. l 
The result is that, in trying to explain how it was that Anglo American rose to 
the position of prominence in South Africa that it did, most writers are forced 
to resort to referring to the f'geniusu of Sir Ernest Oppenheimer as the driving 
force behind the group~s expansion. Without wishing to deny that Sir Ernest was l 
a man with immense financial, management and even technical skills, this would l 
seem to me to be wholly inadequate as an explanation, After all, the leaders of 
the other Groups were no fools either, but their fldutiesf' to steer their concerns 
on a path of world eaansion were different from Sir Ernest's, which was to 
capture dominance of a particular area. 
For a more detailed account of this process, see Duncan Innes, flAccumulation and 
Expansion in the South African Gold Mining Industry, 1945-60" (mimeo, 1976). 
The Angle American Corporation of South Africa, 7th Ordinary General Meeting, 
Minutes of the Proceedings, 27th MW 1924. 
